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A major disadvantage of standard demand and welfare analyses is that they rely on the functional speci…cation of the indirect utility function that is used. An alternative way to analyze policy reforms is based on the revealed preference (RP) approach, whose foundations were laid down by Samuelson (1938 Samuelson ( , 1948 , Houthakker (1950) , Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) . The RP approach makes use of methods from …nite mathematics, which translate conditions for rational consumption behaviour into testable implications which do not depend on any assumptions about the speci…cation of the consumer's demand system or the particular representation of her rational preferences. The major disadvantage of the RP approach, however, is that the predictions of demand responses derived from its restrictions are set-valued, i.e. it is only possible to recover bounds on predicted demands.
As a response Crawford (2003, 2008) proposed blending these two approaches by combining Engel curve estimation with RP conditions. This has shown to be a productive technique. Firstly, it makes the RP conditions applicable to the types of datasets which are widely available to researchers (such as the Family Expenditure Survey from the UK or the Consumption Expenditure Survey from the US). Secondly, the approach is easy to implement and therefore contributes to the practical usefulness of RP conditions. Finally, and principally, it allows for empirical RP analysis with substantial discriminatory and forecasting power. 1 However, whilst Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008) showed how to improve bounds on the demand responses to price changes, they did so without fully exploiting all of the empirical implications of rational preferences. Indeed, transitivity is not required for their e-bounds. We show that e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Further improvements are, in general, possible if preferences can also be assumed to satisfy transitivity. 2 That is if preferences satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP).
For welfare calculations transitivity is, in general, required. This is because non-transitivity can lead to cycles and path-dependence if one attempts to integrate back to utility constant welfare measures. In this paper, we extend the results of Crawford (2003, 2008) to derive sharp bounds on predicted demand responses and on welfare calculations under SARP. 3 These bounds are "sharp for SARP ". For reasons which will become clear we refer to these bounds as "iterated bounds", or i-bounds. We also show how the method originally presented in Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003) can be adapted to provide sharp nonparametric bounds on compensating and equivalent variations.
For compactness, we will only present and discuss theoretical results in our following exposition. However, as we will also indicate, these results imply an easy-to-implement method for de…ning tightest (iterated) bounds on Marshallian demands and compensating and equivalent variations. Evidently, bringing this method to observational data necessarily requires dealing with empirical issues such as measurement error and (un)observed heterogeneity. Here, we can refer to Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) and Blundell, Kristensen and Matzkin (2010) ; these authors propose methodological extensions for dealing with these issues that are directly applicable to the method we introduce below.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our iterated bounds on the Marshallian demands for any number of goods, and we provide an easily implemented method for computing these bounds. In Section 3, we introduce the corresponding method for identifying the tightest bounds on compensating and equivalent variations.
Iterated bounds on Marshallian demands
To set the stage, we …rst brie ‡y recapture the concept of e-bounds introduced by Crawford (2008, henceforth BBC (2008) ). Subsequently, we take the sequential maximum power 2 Note that in situations in which there are only two goods transitivity adds no further restrictions to the weak axiom (see Rose, 1958) . 3 In terms of RP restrictions, the recovery of demand responses under Walras' Law, homogeneity of degree zero and negative semi-de…niteness of the Slutsky matrix is equivalent to imposition of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), whereas the requirement that these demands are consistent with full rationality amounts to the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) (see Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein, 1976) . path idea for constructing bounds on welfare measures developed in Crawford (2003, BBC (2003) ) and use this to introduce the notion of iterated bounds on Marshallian demands. We present an example to demonstrate that these bounds can be used to improve upon the e-bounds if there are more than two goods. Given this result, we next show that our iterated bounds procedure leads to tightest bounds on Marshallian demands. We end this section by presenting an algorithm to compute the iterated bounds. As we will indicate, this algorithm essentially iterates a procedure originally proposed by BBC (2003), which explains the name "iterated bounds".
E-bounds
We assume J goods. For each consumer there exists a set of (nonnegative) Marshallian demand functions q(p;x) for prices p 2 R Consider a set of T price vectors fp t g t=1;:::;T ; we say there are T observations. For a given price vector p t we denote the J-valued demand associated with income x as q t (x), and we refer to the function q t as the expansion path that corresponds to the prices p t . Again, we follow BBC (2008) by assuming weak normality of q t .
Assumption 2 (weak normality)
BBC ( 
To state BBC (2008)'s answer to their question, we …rst need to introduce some revealed preferences (RP) concepts. We start by de…ning direct revealed preference relations R 0 .
De…nition 1 (direct revealed preference) If at prices p t and income x t the consumer chooses q t (x t ) and p
Transitivity of preferences then leads to the next concept of indirect revealed preference relations R.
In our following exposition, we will consider two consistency conditions for utility maximizing consumer behaviour: the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP). It is well-known that SARP is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for utility maximization, while WARP is only a necessary condition (see Varian, 1982 and 2006 , for a detailed discussion).
De…nition 3 (WARP and SARP) (i) The demands q t (x t ), t = 1; :::; T , satisfy WARP if
for any s and t.
(ii) The demands q t (x t ), t = 1; :::; T , satisfy SARP if q t (x t ) R q s (x s ) and q t (x t ) 6 = q s (x s ) then not q s (x s ) R 0 q t (x t ) for any s and t.
Because WARP only uses direct revealed preference relations R 0 , while SARP focuses on indirect revealed preference relations R (so exploiting transitivity of preferences), we obtain that SARP is a stronger condition than WARP. As in BBC (2008), we will assume that the expansion paths q t (x) generate demands that are consistent with utility maximization. In RP terms, this implies the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (SARP)
The demands q t (x), t = 1; : : : ; T and x 2 R ++ , satisfy SARP.
To formalize their notion of e-bounds, BBC (2008) use the concept of intersection demands. To facilitate our following comparison of BBC (2008)'s e-bounds with our iterated bounds, we here introduce these intersection demands in a slightly di¤erent way, i.e. in terms of intersection incomes.
De…nition 4 (intersection income)
The intersection incomex t , for t 2 f1; : : : ; T g, is the maximal income for which
The assumptions of uniqueness and normality ensure that each intersection incomex t is uniquely de…ned. More precisely, it is the income level such that p 0 N q t (x t )= x N . BBC (2008) refer to the corresponding value of the expansion path, q t (x t ); as the intersection demand for observation t.
Given all this, BBC (2008) de…ne the support set
::;T satisfy SARP ;
and they label the bounds on demand responses that are based on S BBC (p N ; x N ) as e-bounds. To end this section, we present a speci…c characterization of the support set S BBC (p N ; x N ). As we will explain, this characterization will directly motivate our following research question, i.e. de…ne "iterated bounds" that improve upon the e-bounds. Essentially, the next proposition distinguishes between two cases for q N 2 S BBC (p N ; x N ): either q N is di¤erent from the intersection demand q t (x t ) for any observation t, or we have q N = q s (x s ) for some observation s. 4 The Appendix contains the proofs of all our results.
meets the e-bounds) if and only if (i) 8t 2 f1; : : : ; T g : p 0 t q t (x t ) < p 0 t q N ; or (ii) 9s 2 f1; : : : ; T g : q N = q s (x s ), and then p 0 t q t (x t ) < p 0 t q N for all t 2 f1; : : : T gnfsg.
Inspection of Proposition 1 reveals that the de…nition of e-bounds nowhere exploits transitivity of preferences, which is captured by the indirect revealed preference relations R. Speci…cally, any q N 2 S BBC (p N ; x N ) can be characterized in terms of direct revealed preference relations R 0 , i.e. it satis…es p
which follows from the de…nition of the intersection demands, and
which follows from Proposition 1. Putting it di¤erently, e-bounds only use the empirical restrictions that are implied by WARP consistency. However, as indicated above, utility maximizing behaviour requires SARP consistency, which generally involves further restrictions than WARP consistency. 5 Therefore, in what follows we will de…ne iterated bounds that do fully exploit the restrictions implied by transitivity of preferences. Essentially, this will require generalizations of the concepts intersection income and intersection demand that are based on the relations R (instead of R 0 ).
I-bounds
We de…ne iterated bounds, or i-bounds, as bounds on demand responses based on a support set S (p N ; x N ) that accounts for all possible incomes x t (rather than onlyx t ), i.e.
q N 2 B(p N ; x N ) fp N ; p t ; q N ; q t (x t )g t=1;:::;T satisfy SARP :
Because this set S (p N ; x N ) considers all demands on the expansion paths q t , it is the tightest (i.e. smallest) SARP-based support set by construction. In turn, this implies that i-bounds are tightest bounds on demand responses. However, as it is formulated here, the set S (p N ; x N ) is not directly useful from a practical point of view: for each t, it requires considering in…nitely many points on every expansion path. To derive an operational characterization of S (p N ; x N ), we will make use of the following notion of most informative income.
De…nition 5 (most informative income) The most informative income b x t , for t 2 f1; : : : ; T g, is the maximal income for which
i.e. there exist x u ; x v ; : : : ; x w such that
This concept of most informative income extends the earlier notion of intersection income by using indirect revealed preference relations R instead of (only) direct revealed preference relations R 0 . Because the relations R include the relations R 0 by construction, we obtain b x t x t . Like before, the assumptions of uniqueness and weak normality make that most informative incomes b
x t are uniquely de…ned. However, in contrast to intersection incomes, there is no closed formula for computing most informative incomes. Fortunately, as we will discuss in Section 2.3, we can de…ne an easy-to-implement (…nite and e¢ cient) algorithm to compute b x t by iterating the procedure for computing the intersection incomes. Analogous to before, we will refer to the associated value of the expansion path, q t (b x t ), as the most informative demand for observation t.
The next proposition provides a characterization of the set S (p N ; x N ) that parallels the one of S BBC (p N ; x N ) in Proposition 1. It also provides a speci…c de…nition of S (p N ; x N ) in terms of the most informative incomes b x t . In practical applications, this allows for constructing the set S (p N ; x N ) once these most informative incomes have been identi…ed. We conclude this section by Example 1, which demonstrates that BBC (2008)'s support set S BBC (p N ; x N ) (yielding e-bounds on demand responses) need not coincide with the smallest SARP-based support set S (p N ; x N ) (yielding iterated or tightest bounds on demand responses). The example also illustrates the central intuition behind this result. Speci…cally, it presents expansion paths where, for some t (t = 1 in Example 1), the most informative income b x t is strictly above the intersection incomex t , which implies that there exists q N with q N Rq t (b x t ) but not q N R 0 q t (b x t ). Because the set S (p N ; x N ) must satisfy SARP, this yields the restriction p 0 t q t (b x t ) < p 0 t q N ; which is stronger than p 0 t q t (x t ) < p 0 t q N (because b x t >x t ). In turn, this e¤ectively excludes from the set S (p N ; x N ) some q N that belongs to the set S BBC (p N ; x N ). This demonstrates that, in general, we can have S (p N ; x N ) ( S BBC (p N ; x N ). As a …nal note, we emphasize that we need more than two goods for S (p N ; x N ) ( S BBC (p N ; x N ). Indeed, as indicated above, the support set S BBC (p N ; x N ) exploits the empirical restrictions implied by WARP consistency. And it is well-known that WARP and SARP have the same empirical content if there are only two goods (see Rose, 1958) , so that we always get S (p N ; x N ) = S BBC (p N ; x N ) in this case.
Example 1 We consider the support set S
BBC (p N ; x N ) for p N = (3; 2; 4) and x N = 15. Suppose we observe two expansion paths q 1 and q 2 , which are associated with the prices p 1 = (4; 3; 2) and p 2 = (2; 4; 3).
Suppose we have the intersection incomesx 1 = 13:5 andx 2 = 15:8, with corresponding intersection demands q 1 (x 1 ) = (2; 0:5; 2) and q 2 (x 2 ) = (2:3; 2:05; 1):
Next, we assume the following most informative incomes. Let b x 1 = 15 >x 1 , with
while b x 2 = e x 2 and, thus, q 2 (x 2 ) = q 2 (b x 2 ). We remark that an expansion path q 1 (x 1 ) containing both q 1 (b x 1 ) and q 1 (x 1 ) does not con ‡ict with our earlier assumptions. We can then show that S (p N ; x N ) ( S BBC (p N ; x N ). To obtain the result, it su¢ ces to show that there exists q N with q N 2 S BBC (p N ; x N ) and q N = 2 S(p N ; x N ):
For the current example, this applies to q N = (1; 2; 2) (which e¤ ectively meets p
On the other hand, we also obtain q 0 = 2 S(p N ; x N ): the demands q N ; q 1 (b x 1 ), q 2 (b x 2 ) do not meet SARP, which a fortiori implies q N = 2 S(p N ; x N ); in particular, we get
An algorithm for computing most informative incomes
The following algorithm uses the approach in BBC (2003) to de…ne the most informative incomeŝ x 1 ; : : : ;x T and, thus, also the corresponding demands q 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; q T (x T ).
Algorithm 1 (computing most informative incomes)
Input: fp N ; x N g and fp 1 ; : : : ; p T ; q 1 (x 1 ) ; : : : ; q T (x T )g. Output:x 1 ; : : : ;x T .
Step 0: Set s = 0 and F s = fx 1 ; : : : ;
Step 1: Set F s+1 = arg max xt2Fs (x t = p 0 t q 1 (x)) ; : : : ; arg max xt2Fs (x t = p 0 t q T (x)) .
Step 2: If F s+1 F s then set fx 1 ; : : : ;x T g = F s+1 and stop. Else set s = s + 1 and go to Step 1.
Note that
Step 0 of this algorithm delivers the intersection incomesx t , which BBC (2008) originally considered to de…ne their e-bounds on Marshallian demands. To de…ne our most informative incomes b x t (and so i-bounds on Marshallian demands), we iterate this procedure in Steps 1 and 2. This iteration implies that most informative incomes may e¤ectively exceed intersection incomes (i.e. b x t >x t ). As explained in our discussion of Example 1, such an instance e¤ectively obtains S (p N ; x N ) ( S BBC (p N ; x N ). The following lemma states two important properties of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1 (i) Algorithm 1 converges in a …nite number of steps.
(ii) For any x t we have q t (x t ) q t (x t ) , q N Rq t (x t ) for any q N 2 S(p N ; x N ):
Property (i) shows that the algorithm is feasible in …nite time, which is a minimal requirement for practical applicability. Next, property (ii) states that each demand q t (x t ) represents the 'highest point' on the expansion path q t that is revealed worse than any bundle in the support set S(p N ; x N ).
Two further remarks are in order. First, our earlier assumptions ensure that any income level computed in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 is uniquely de…ned. As such, computing any set F s+1 is straightforward. Moreover, one can show that the worst case complexity of this algorithm is T 3 , which makes that the algorithm is e¢ ciently implemented. 7 Second, it is interesting to note that Algorithm 1 can also be used to extend the 'best'SARP-based test that was originally proposed by BBC (2003). 8 Speci…cally, using information on expansion paths q t (t = 1; :::; T ), these authors de…ne a best possible test for SARP consistency of a particular quantity bundle q N (x N ) (with N 2 f1; :::; T g) that is conditional on some a priori de…ned (revealed preference) ordering of the observations. Algorithm 1 provides the basis for an alternative 'best'test: we can use the algorithm to de…ne the set S(p N ; x N ), so that we can subsequently check whether
is SARP inconsistent). It can be veri…ed that this alternative test actually is formally identical to the one of BBC (2003), except from the important di¤erence that it does not require a prior ordering speci…cation -it simultaneously considers all possible (T !) orderings of the T observations.
Compensating and equivalent variations
In this section, we use the results outlined above to de…ne tightest bounds on compensating and equivalent variations. We …rst present formal de…nitions of compensating and equivalent variations. Subsequently, we show how to compute tightest bounds on these welfare measures by using our results of the previous sections.
Suppose the policy maker wants to compare two situations characterized by di¤erent price regimes:
++ represents original (observed; pre-reform) prices and p N 2 R J ++ represents new (unobserved; post-reform) prices. Income is the same in the two situations, i.e. x O = x N . Let e (p; u) be the expenditure function that associates minimal expenditure with prices p and utility u. By construction, rational consumer behaviour implies e (p O ; u O ) = e (p N ; u N ) = x N (= x O ) (where we assume that the total budget is …xed). Then, we get the following de…nitions.
De…nition 6 (compensating and equivalent variations)
Tightest bounds for CV. To bound CV , we need to de…ne bounds on e (p N ; u O ). To do so, we can use the bounds on the cost function established by BBC (2003). Speci…cally, because q (p O ; x N ) is assumed to be the observed (pre-reform) demand, we can use the bounds for the cost function c (q O ; p N ) (that gives the minimal cost for obtaining a bundle on the same indi¤erence curve as q O at prices p N -this function is equivalent to the expenditure function evaluated at the utility level u O generated by q O and prices p N . We can thus use the Algorithms A and B of BBC (2003) to obtain tightest bounds for CV.
Tightest bounds for EV. To bound EV, we need tightest bounds on e (p O ; u N ). Let e L denote the tightest (= 'highest') lower bound and e U the tightest (= 'lowest') upper bound, so that e
The next algorithm computes e L and e U . (In the algorithm, we make use of the vectors P j 2 R J of which all components are zero except for the j-th component, which equals one.)
Algorithm 2 (computing iterated bounds on EV ) Input: fp N ; x N g and fp 1 ; : : : ; p T ; q 1 (x 1 ) ; : : : ; q T (x T )g.
Output: e L and e U .
Step 1: Use Algorithm 1 to compute the most informative incomesx 1 ; : : : ;x T .
Step 2: Set W (p N ; x N ) = ;. For any k 2 f0; : : : ; J 1g, take any selection of k mutually di¤ erent j 1 ; : : : ; j k 2 f1; : : : ; T g and any selection of J 1 k mutually di¤ erent j k+1 ; : : : ; j J 1 2 f1; : : : ; Jg.
If p N ; p j1 ; : : : ; p j k ; P j k+1 ; : : : ; P j J 1 are J linear independent vectors, then compute the unique
q N = 0; : : : ; P 0 j J 1 q N = 0 and add q N to W (p N ; x N ). Else take another selection or go to the next k.
Step 3:
Step 4: For any q N 2 V (p N ; x N ), use Algorithm A (resp. Algorithm B) of BBC (2003) to compute e L q N (resp. e U q N ).
Step 5:
This algorithm is very easy-to-implement and will e¢ ciently compute e L and e U . More precisely, we can refer to our discussion on the e¢ ciency of Algorithm 1 in the previous section, which carries over to BBC (2003)'s Algorithms A and B (which are formally similar to Algorithm 1). Next, Proposition 2 implies that the closure of S(p N ; x N ) is a convex set de…ned by linear constraints. Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 2 then compute the extreme points (or vertices) of this convex set. Essentially, de…ning each such extreme point boils down to …nding the unique solution of a system with J linear constraints that follow from the characterization of the convex set. That is, the budget constraint (i.e. p q N = 0).
9 Some of the solutions of Step 2 do not necessarily belong to the support set S (p N ; x N ), which is why we need the additional Step 3 to obtain only the relevant points (i.e. the extreme points). Finally, by construction the set V (p N ; x N ) is …nite and discrete, which implies that Step 4 of Algorithm 2 is computable in …nite time.
Example 2 illustrates the di¤erent steps of Algorithm 2. The following lemma formally states that the algorithm e¤ectively compute the tightest bounds on EV.
Lemma 2 (iterated bounds are tightest) The values e
L and e U produced by Algorithm 2 de…ne tightest bounds on EV. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the intuition behind Algorithm 2. For simplicity, we focus on a setting with only two goods and three observed price vectors (i.e. three expansion paths). The upperleft panel of the …gure shows the support set S (p N ; x N ), which corresponds to the bold line segment.
Example 2

10
The set S (p N ; x N ) is characterized by the most informative incomesx 1 ;x 2 andx 3 , which are obtained through Step 1 of Algorithm 2. The corresponding set of extreme points V (p N ; x N ) = fq N 1 ; q N 2 g; this set is constructed in Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 2. The upper-right and lower-left panels of Figure 1 then show the inner and outer bounds for the indi¤ erence curves associated with, respectively, q N 1 and q N 2 .
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In turn, this de…nes the lower bounds e L q N 1 and e L q N 2 and the upper bounds e U q N 1 and e U q N 2 , which are generated in Step 4 of Algorithm 2. Finally, the lower-right panel of Figure 1 shows the resulting values of e L and e U , which are obtained in Step 5 of Algorithm 2. Here, we have e L = minfe
Step 2 is directly implementable, we also note that it should not be the most e¢ cient way to compute the extreme points of our convex set. Indeed, given that this set is characterized by linear constraints, computing these extreme points is equivalent to …nding all basic feasible solutions of a system of linear equations. Alternative algorithms for computing these basic feasible solutions are available in the Operations Research literature.
1 0 Since there are only two goods in this example, the support set S (p N ; x N ) actually coincides with BBC's support set S BBC (p N ; x N ), which are characterized by intersection demands (see Proposition 1). (Correspondingly, the most informative incomesx 1 ;x 2 andx 3 equal the intersection incomes e x 1 ; e x 2 and e x 3 .) As explained above, the sets S (p N ; x N ) and S BBC (p N ; x N ) need not coincide in case there are more than two goods. We choose to focus on a two-goods setting here as this allows us to better illustrate the mechanics of Algorithm 2. In this paper we have complemented and generalized the results of Crawford (2003, 2008) . We de…ned tightest "iterated" (nonparametric) bounds on Marshallian demands that apply to any number of goods. These bounds are sharp under the strong axiom of revealed preference, SARP. We were thus able to show they provide sharp bounds for welfare measures.
We have established a complete toolkit for a powerful nonparametric welfare analysis based on Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. We show that our iterated bounds method involves computational algorithms that are easily implemented.
Proof of Lemma 2
To bound EV and thus e(p O ; u N ), we need to …nd, for any q N 2 S(p N ; x N ); the nonparametrically constructed 'revealed-preferred' set RP (q N ), which contains all bundles to which q N is preferred to, and the 'not-revealed-worse'set N RW (q N ), which contains all bundles that are not revealed worse to q N . (See Varian (1982) for an extensive discussion of the sets RP (q N ) and N RW (q N ).)
Given our results in Section 2, we can de…ne tightest bounds on EV by computing e L q N (resp. e U q N ) for any q N 2 S(p N ; x N ). Now, Proposition 2 implies that the closure of S(p N ; x N ) is a convex set and, as discussed in the main text, V (p N ; x N ) contains all the extreme points of this convex set. As such, we get that any q N 2 S(p N ; x N ) can be written as a convex combination of elements of V (p N ; x N ), i.e. q N = P k k q k (with k > 0 and
Given this, and using convexity of preferences (represented by the sets RP (q N ) and N RW (q N )), we get RP (q N ) RP (q k ) for at least one q k 2 V (p N ; x N ) and also that N RW (q N ) N RW (q k ) for at least one, possibly di¤erent, q k 2 V (p N ; x N ). As such, in order to nonparametrically identify the lower bound e L (respectively, upper bound e U ), we need to take the minimum (respectively, maximum) of the lower (respectively, upper) bounds over all the elements of V (p N ; x N ), i.e. e L = min q N 2V (p N ;x N ) e L q N and e U = max q N 2V (p N ;x N ) e U q N .
